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Abstract 
It is pretty obvious to most of us that self-consciousness is a product of evolution. But its 
nature is unknown. We propose here a scenario addressing a possible evolutionary nature of 
self-consciousness covering the segment linking pre-human primates to humans. The scenario 
is based on evolutions of representations and of inter-subjectivity that could have taken place 
within the minds of our pre-human ancestors1. We begin by situating self-consciousness 
relatively to other aspects of human consciousness. With the help of anthropology, we date a 
possible starting point of our scenario at a time when our non self-conscious pre-human 
ancestors were able to build meaningful representations and were capable of inter-
subjectivity, like are our today modern apes. As the proposed scenario is based on an 
evolution of representations, we recall an existing model for meaningful representations based 
on the generation of meaningful information by systems submitted to internal constraints. 
This model allows us to define representations of conspecifics and auto-representations that 
we assume as having been present in the minds of our pre-human ancestors.  
The next step of the scenario is to consider an evolution of inter-subjectivity towards 
identification with conspecifics that could have led to a merger of the auto-representation with 
the representations of conspecifics in the minds of our ancestors. Such a merger brought the 
auto-representation to become about an entity existing in the environment, as were the 
representations of conspecifics. We consider that such identification with conspecifics has 
introduced in the mind of our ancestors an elementary and embryonic sense of being an 
existing entity that we name ‘ancestral self-consciousness’. The same process has also 
imposed to our ancestors an identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics which 
has produced an important anxiety increase that could have blocked the evolutionary process. 
We propose that the performances developed by our ancestors to manage that anxiety increase 
have also generated significant evolutionary advantages that have helped the development of 
ancestral self-consciousness and favored its evolution toward our full-fledged self-
consciousness. It is also proposed that some pre-human primates have avoided the anxiety 
increase by finding a niche where evolutionary advantages were not necessary. This may have 
led to our today apes. 
The contribution of anxiety to the proposed scenario brings to position anxiety management 
as having guided the evolution of self-consciousness and as still being a key player in our 
today human minds.  
Regarding philosophy of mind, possible links between phenomenal consciousness and the 
proposed nature of self-consciousness are introduced. 
The conclusion presents a summary of the points addressed here. Possible continuations are 
highlighted as related to human mind, to anxiety management and to artificial intelligence. 
 
Keywords: self-consciousness, pre-human, meaningful representation, auto-representation, 
inter-subjectivity, evolution, anxiety, evolutionary engine, ancestral self-consciousness, 
primitive self-consciousness, pre-reflective self-consciousness, phenomenal consciousness. 
 
                                                 
1 The current paper is an enriched summary of presentations made at TSC and ASSC conferences, and 
elsewhere (Menant, 2005, 2006, 2010 a & b).  
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1) Consciousness and self-consciousness. Humans, apes and pre-human primates 
Human consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people would today disagree with an 
evolutionary history of human mind. But human consciousness is a complex and still 
mysterious performance. Different perspectives have been developed to try to understand it. 
Among the key ones: as concepts of consciousness like phenomenal consciousness, access 
consciousness, monitoring consciousness and self-consciousness (Block, 1995); as functions 
of consciousness like adaptation and learning (Baars, 1993); as levels of consciousness like 
core consciousness and extended consciousness (Damasio, 1999); as self-representational 
theory of consciousness where a mental state is phenomenally conscious iff it represents itself 
in the right way (Kriegel, 2012).  
The choice made here is to focus on self-consciousness following an evolutionary approach. 
We define self-consciousness as being ‘the representation of oneself as an existing entity like 
others humans are represented as existing’ (representations are here understood as being 
meaningful representations
2
). Such a definition of self-consciousness refers to the 
representations of conspecifics and does not use the concept of self. It is different from 
defining self-consciousness as ‘the possession of the concept of the self and the ability to use 
this concept in thinking about oneself.’ (Block, 1995). In the proposed evolutionary approach 
self-consciousness is the consciousness of oneself as an existing entity rather than the 
consciousness of a self
3
. 
Regarding self-consciousness in philosophy of mind it is worth noticing that at the end of the 
20th century self-consciousness ‘has fallen on hard times. Though once regarded as the very 
essence of mind, most philosophers and psychologists today treat it as a marginal and 
derivative phenomenon’ (Van Gulick, 1988). But the beginning of our 21st century is 
presenting a new perspective where self-consciousness is becoming a subject of interest under 
various thematics (Crone & al., 2012). Some address human self-representations (Vosgerau, 
2009). Others take evolution into account without expliciting a possible scenario (Carruthers 
& al., 2012). 
What we propose here is to formalize an evolutionary scenario that starts at a time when our 
non self-conscious pre-human ancestors were managing meaningful representations and were 
capable of inter-subjectivity. The former performance exists in primates as most animals 
manage meaningful representations of elements of their environment (like predators or preys) 
in order to satisfy survival constraints. Regarding the performance of inter-subjectivity, 
anthropology has shown that ‘around six million years ago, our pre-human ancestors might 
have had such capacities that broadly resembled those of some modern apes’ (Bednarik, 
2003). As modern apes are non self-conscious primates capable of inter-subjectivity, we can 
compare them to our pre-human ancestors and position the starting point of our evolutionary 
scenario at around six millions years ago. This comparison from primatology positions the 
behaviour of modern apes as close to the ones of these pre-human ancestors. It allows us to 
refer to what we know about the behaviour and characteristics of the former to address the 
ones of the later. A first point coming from this comparison is that our pre-human ancestors 
were far from having our mental capacities as modern apes lack several human performances 
and have a brain much smaller than ours. Like today apes, our ancestors had a limited access 
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 Meaningful representations have been defined as networks of meaningful information [Menant, 2011]. Their 
characteristics and usages in the current paper are presented in the next paragraph 
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 The concept of self is not needed in the proposed scenario. We will however look at introducing it as based on 
the evolutionary nature of self-consciousness presented here (see 5). 
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to concepts and causality (Woodward, 2007) and had no access to human type language.  
As our scenario uses the notion of meaningful representation managed by pre-human 
primates, we need to provide clear enough a background about such representations that we 
position as meaningful for the agent that carries them
4
. The next paragraph will recall the 
definitions of meaningful information and representations with applications to representations 
of conspecifics and to auto-representation that we use in our scenario.  
 
2) Evolutions of representations and of inter-subjectivity. The possibility for self-
consciousness in evolution 
2.1 Meaningful representations. Representations of conspecifics and auto-representation 
As introduced above, the proposed scenario about an evolutionary nature of self-
consciousness began 6 million years ago. It uses an evolution of the meaningful 
representations that our pre-human ancestors were carrying. Meaningful representations are 
made of meaningful information understood as information generated by systems submitted to 
internal constraints. Such approach can be summarized as follows:  
When a system submitted to an internal constraint receives information from its environment, 
it can generate meaningful information (a meaning) that will be used to implement an action 
in order to satisfy the constraint.  
The generated meaning is the connection existing between the received information and the 
constraint. A meaning generation process has been formalized in terms of a Meaning 
Generator System (MGS) (Menant, 2003). The MGS is represented in Fig 1. 
 
 
      
            Fig. 1.The Meaning Generator System. 
 
As an example a monkey has a ‘stay alive’ constraint to satisfy (like all animals have). If the 
monkey sees a hyena, the connection of the sensed information with the constraint will 
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 Our starting point is meaningful representations for non self-conscious animals, not for human minds. The 
proposed approach is not to be considered as part of the ‘Representational Theories of Consciousness’ (Lycan, 
2006) which are about representations in human minds.  
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produce meaningful information like ‘danger’. And that meaning will trigger an action like 
hiding or getting away in order to satisfy the constraint.  
On a general standpoint, agents contain several different MGSs (different sensors delivering 
different information, different constraints, different connections between received 
information and constraints). As a consequence, the perception of an item generates several 
different meanings within an agent. These meanings are networked and include the existing 
action scenarios related to the satisfaction of the constraint. All these elements participate to 
the build up of a meaningful representation of the item for the agent. Our monkeys represent 
hyenas under different components (shape, sound, odor, environmental changes, ...) including 
the action scenarios that are permanently enriched. As another example, meaningful 
representations of stones and sticks carried by our pre-human ancestors included their usage 
to crack nuts and to collect termites.  
Meaningful representations are constraint satisfaction driven. The constraint satisfaction 
processes dynamically embed the agent in its environment. 
For an agent, a meaningful representation of an item of the environment is made of:  
- Meanings generated by information relative to the item that the agent receives from its 
environment.  
- Meanings generated by information related to the item and coming from inside the agent. 
(for an organism: interoception, proprioception, action scenarios with history of outcomes and 
emotions).  
These elements of the representation are interdependent and characterize the represented 
entity
5
. Representations do not exist alone, by themselves. They are generated by and for the 
agent carrying the MGSs for the satisfaction of the agent’s constraints. These representations 
are dynamic as connected to past and future actions related to the represented entity. They are 
updated through new experiences
6
.  
The above applies to our evolutionary approach where animals are agents that have to satisfy 
stay alive and group life constraints. Animals have intense relations with the items of their 
environments in terms of constraints satisfactions. They generate and use meaningful 
representations of these items, and these representations contain the characteristic ‘belongs to 
the environment’ which is an implicit part of the meanings. 
Among the many items of the environment that are represented within animals sharing a 
group life, there is one that deserves a specific attention for our scenario. It is the 
representation of conspecifics. As our pre-human ancestors were quite similar to modern apes, 
we can look at the behavior of the latter to address the relations with conspecifics of the 
former. Group life of modern apes goes with interdependencies and hierarchies among 
elements of the group, with dominances and conflicts. Such a relational context implies the 
need for detailed representations of conspecifics as global entities existing in the environment 
and interacting with it. The same was true for our pre-human ancestors where the components 
of these representations were the ones of items of the environment as presented above. Such 
meaningful representations were mandatory for the satisfaction of vital constraints and group 
life constraints.  
There is another type of representation carried by our pre-human ancestors that is important 
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 The term ‘representation’ is to be understood as addressing meaningful representations. 
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 Such meaningful representations contain only the meanings related to the represented item for the agent. They 
do not include all possible aspects of the represented item which would lead to a combinational explosion. The 
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for our scenario. Our pre-human ancestors also received information from their own bodies 
and from the actions they implemented on the environment. Different parts of the body could 
be seen like hands and feet, or felt by tactile sensation. Vocalisations could be heard also. 
Actions implemented on the environment were perceived with their results modifying that 
environment. All these information made available meanings about the body with the 
associated emotions. This brings to consider that our pre-human ancestors were carrying an 
‘auto-representation’7 made of representations of different parts of the body with the action 
scenarios relative to the interactions with the environment, including past experiences and 
emotions. But that auto-representation carried by our ancestors was very limited as compared 
to the representations that we humans have of ourselves. This because our pre-human 
ancestors had small brain sizes as compared to ours and were not conscious of themselves as 
overall entities existing in the environment. They were not self-conscious.  
2.2 Pre-human primates inter-subjectivity and identification with conspecifics. Ancestral 
self-consciousness 
Inter-subjectivity is the sharing of perceptual or affective experiences between two or more 
subjects. We humans possess a high degree of inter-subjectivity. Several animal studies have 
shown that some modern apes are capable of inter-subjectivity related to empathy (Preston & 
de Waal, 2002), to bodily mimesis (Zlatev, 2000), and to mirror neurons (Gallese, 2001). By 
similarity we can assume that our pre-human primate ancestors were capable of inter-
subjectivity.  
Identification with others is a higher level of performances. We humans are capable of 
identifying with others on physical and mental standpoints. We can easily put ourselves in the 
shoes of other humans and understand their desires, their intentions and their emotions. We 
use these performances, mostly unconsciously, for joint action, for imitation and for the 
understanding of others. Regarding modern apes, their capability to identify with conspecifics 
is subject of debates in the research community (Zlatev, 2000), (Decety & Chaminade, 2003), 
(Tomasello & all.2005). Whatever our progresses in the understanding of primate mental 
performances, we can agree that the performance of identifying with conspecifics came up in 
evolution sometime between our pre-human ancestors and us humans. Our position here is to 
assume that the evolutionary level of our pre-human ancestors was ready to implement an 
elementary and limited level of identification with conspecifics. And it is logical to consider 
that such performance has been favoured by evolution as it introduced some evolutionary 
advantages
8
.  
When our ancestors reached the capability to identify with their conspecifics, they were 
carrying the two types of meaningful representations presented in the previous paragraph: an 
auto-representation and representations of conspecifics. Identification with conspecifics 
brought the auto-representation and the representations of conspecifics to progressively 
become about a same entity. As a consequence, the two representations tended to merge their 
contents, and the meanings of the one became available to the other. By this process the auto-
representation became able to access a characteristic of the representation of conspecifics: 
being about an entity existing in the environment. This brought our ancestors to slowly access 
the possibility to represent themselves as existing entities, like the conspecifics were 
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 We choose for our non self-conscious ancestors the wording ‘auto-representation’ in order to avoid using ‘self-
representation’ which could call for the concept of self that we do not need to use here. 
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represented. This new performance began very slowly and progressively. The first elements 
of the auto-representation to participate to that process were probably the ones related to the 
body that were quite identical in the representations of conspecifics, like hands, feet and 
vocalizations.  
We want to consider that such evolution of the auto-representation acquiring progressively the 
characteristics of the representation of an entity existing in the environment has generated the 
first elements of self-consciousness in the minds of our ancestors
9
. We take this event as 
having been the first step of primates into the world of self-consciousness.  
Identification with conspecifics began by delivering only an elementary and embryonic sense 
of being an existing entity which was very far from the full-fledged self-consciousness that 
we humans carry nowdays. But it is clear that a primate accessing a representation of herself, 
even if very limited, as an entity existing in the environment is a new performance in 
evolution. Such a performance did not exist before and has to be characterized and named. 
Philosophers have developed concepts like primitive self-consciousness or pre-reflective self-
consciousness that can be related to some aspects of our today self-consciousness. But these 
concepts are based on the performances of human minds existing in our today brains which 
are bigger and more performant than the brains of our pre-human ancestors. It looks difficult 
to relate these concepts to pre-human minds deprived of self-consciousness. In order to avoid 
the questions and problems that would be risen by using these concepts at this level of our 
approach, we prefer introducing an original naming. As that elementary and embryonic 
version of self-consciousness initially came up in the mind of our pre-human ancestors, we 
propose to call it ‘ancestral self-consciousness’ and define it as an elementary and embryonic 
representation of oneself as an existing entity, like conspecifics are represented as existing. 
At this level of our approach, a few points relative to the nature of that embryonic self-
consciousness are to be highlighted:  
- The representational nature of ancestral self-consciousness is to be underlined. Ancestral 
self-consciousness was carried by our ancestors as a representation of themselves as existing 
in the environment in a limited and embryonic form. It came from a merger of the auto-
representation with the representations of conspecifics. Both were meaningful representations.  
- Language was not mandatory for the coming up of that ancestral self-consciousness. If 
group life was needed for the first elements of self-consciousness to come through the process 
of identification with conspecifics, language was not a prerequisite. We will see in the next 
paragraph how language, on an evolutionary advantage basis, has been part of the evolution 
of self-consciousness in the proposed approach. 
- The ‘elementary and embryonic sense of being an existing entity’ is taken globally. It does 
not look realistic for such a limited level of self-consciousness to introduce specificities about 
first or third person perspectives, or about self-consciousness as subject or as object. This 
position will be readdressed when looking at the evolution of ancestral self-consciousness 
towards our full-fledged self-consciousness (4.1).  
-The coming up of ancestral self-consciousness and its evolution toward full-fledged self-
consciousness look as natural events with the evolutionary advantages brought by the 
identification with conspecifics. But we will see in the next paragraph that the identification 
with conspecifics has also been the source of an anxiety increase that came as an obstacle to 
the coming up of ancestral self-consciousness. At this level of our approach, self-
consciousness is only a possibility in evolution. 
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3) Anxiety as an evolutionary engine. The high probability for self-consciousness 
3.1 Identification with conspecifics and anxiety increase. Evolution toward self-
consciousness or not 
The performance of identification with conspecifics has been an important step in primate 
evolution: it has made ancestral self-consciousness a possibility. But identification with 
conspecifics also produced an important anxiety increase. Six million years ago the 
environment of pre-human primates was one of survival of the fittest with many dangers and 
risks. Representations of endangered or suffering relatives were also part of the representation 
of conspecifics. By identifying with these conspecifics, our ancestors were brought to feel the 
dangers, sufferings, pains and distresses encountered by the conspecifics, which came in 
addition to her own ones. These negative emotions about potentially dangerous situations 
were many and diverse. They were memorized and generated anticipations of threats. Overall, 
a dramatic upsurge in potential vulnerability was created, a traumatism leading to an 
important anxiety increase. Anxiety is a feeling of uneasiness, apprehension or fear related to 
threats that are perceived to be uncontrollable or unavoidable. Such multiple sources of fears 
encountered by our pre-human ancestors led to an important anxiety increase. Normal anxiety 
is a positive emotion as it allows early alerts against threats. It has been shaped by natural 
selection (Marks & Nesse, 1994). But too much anxiety has negative impacts perturbating 
mental and physical activities. It can lead to panic. Pathological anxiety triggers behavioural 
responses lacking adaptive value. This is true for humans and for some animals (Ohl & al., 
2008). Such an increase in anxiety may have impacted the survival conditions of the pre-
humans facing it and become unbearable. We correspondingly propose that the evolution of 
pre-human primates accessing the level of identification with conspecifics met a forking path 
with two options. The first one was to avoid the unbearable sufferings coming from the 
anxiety increase. That option implied for these primates to stop the identification with 
conspecifics and the associated evolutionary process. Such option has blocked the evolution 
of pre-human primates before they could access the performance of ancestral self-
consciousness, and it has probably led to our today modern apes through ecological niches 
that allowed survival without significant performances increase. The second option was to 
cope at best with the level of anxiety, to maintain the identification with conspecifics with its 
evolutionary advantages and find ways to limit the anxiety increase. That option allowed an 
access to ancestral self-consciousness and a continuation of the evolutionary process toward 
full-fledged self-consciousness. We develop that option in the next paragraphs with the 
anxiety limitation processes.  
Fig 2 represents the forking path in our evolutionary scenario where the limitation of anxiety 
had to be sufficient to allow our pre-human ancestors to build up the level of ancestral self-
consciousness and open the way to an evolution toward full-fledged self-consciousness.  
As shown in Fig 2, the scenario proposes that ancestral self-consciousness, besides 
participating to the evolution toward full-fledged self-consciousness, has continued to exist 
through evolution. Ancestral self-consciousness holds a generic position as being an 
elementary sense of being an existing entity. We want to consider that we still carry in the 
background of our human mind a diffuse sense of being, sourced in ancestral self-
consciousness. The consequences of that position are highlighted here after (4.1 & 5).  
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                 Fig.2- Forking path in the evolution of self-consciousness 
 
 
3.2 Evolutionary advantages of anxiety limitation. An evolutionary engine toward self-
consciousness 
The previous paragraph has shown that the high anxiety increase encountered by our pre-
human ancestors had to be limited in order to allow the coming up of ancestral self-
consciousness and its evolution toward our today full-fledged self-consciousness. We need 
now to present the corresponding anxiety limitation processes that our ancestors may have 
gone through, and see how these processes have also introduced important evolutionary 
advantages that have significantly leveraged the overall evolutionary process toward self-
consciousness.  
We have seen that the anxiety increase came from the identification with suffering or 
endangered conspecifics which produced a feeling of increased vulnerability. Two sets of 
actions may have been implemented by our ancestors in order to limit that anxiety and the 
corresponding vulnerabilities: reduce the sufferings of conspecifics, and enhance the 
efficiencies of group and of individuals. 
To reduce the sufferings of conspecifics, our ancestors had to care more for them, in terms of 
protection and in terms of consolation. Regarding protection, our ancestors may have 
developed alert systems for warning of dangers, implemented defenses against the dangers 
like predators, and taken care of wounded conspecifics. Consolation was with empathy acting 
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close to the conspecifics. These improvements in conspecifics caring and consolation were 
reciprocal. They amplified inter-subjectivity and identifications with others. Regarding the 
enhancement of group and individual efficiencies, we assume that they began with the 
development of the modest performances brought in at the beginning of identification with 
conspecifics like joint action and imitation. More formal cooperations were then developed 
with coordinated actions, understanding of other’s mental states, tasks simulations with action 
programs improvements and communications. These performances were interdependent and 
called for the development of other ones like social rules, social learning and teaching, and 
language. These performances, initially developed for anxiety limitation purposes, had 
obvious evolutionary advantages. Their implementation has accelerated the overall 
evolutionary process towards self-consciousness. The development of ancestral self-
consciousness was not any more hampered by a high anxiety level and the evolution of 
ancestral self-consciousness toward our full-fledged self-consciousness was accelerated.  
Perhaps these evolutionary advantages could have occurred through a classic evolutionary 
process using selections after random mutations, without the proposed scenario. But our 
ancestors were not much used to cooperate with each other. They preferred living in a context 
of competitive social interactions as do today apes (Tomasello & al., 2005). Changing their 
behaviors into cooperation was not natural. We propose here that it is the specific need to 
limit the anxiety increase that has led our ancestors to changes their social behavior, with the 
resulting evolutionary advantages locking the process.  
So the hypothesis presented here is that the performances initially implemented for anxiety 
limitation have dramatically accelerated the development of evolutionary advantages leading 
to self-consciousness. As part of the process, the amplification of inter-subjectivity and 
identification with conspecifics associated to these performances has introduced a positive 
feedback loop which has produced an acceleration in the evolutionary process.  
Overall, we can say that the performances implemented by our ancestors in order to limit the 
anxiety increase have created an evolutionary engine, accelerating and strongly favoring the 
coming up of self-consciousness in evolution. This characteristic of our scenario highlights 
the importance of anxiety limitation as a human specificity attached to the nature of self-
consciousness since its dawn in evolution.  
Fig 3 summarizes the key points of the scenario about the evolutionary approach to ancestral 
self-consciousness and to full-fledged self-consciousness. 
The overall evolutionary scenario brings to highlight the following points: 
a) Anxiety limitation, as a new constraint for our ancestors, has participated to the generation 
of many new anxiety related meanings (see meaning generation in Fig 1). Many 
representations existing in the minds of our pre-human ancestors became populated with 
anxiety related meanings during the evolution toward ancestral self-consciousness and full-
fledged self-consciousness. We will also see hereunder (4.1) how the anxiety limitation 
processes have by themselves generated new anxieties that had in turn to be limited. We 
regroup under the term ‘anxiety management’ the chaining and networking of anxiety 
limitations with generations of new anxieties to be limited.  
b) The evolutionary advantages sometimes presented as associated to self-consciousness are 
not directly related to the performance of self-consciousness. These evolutionary advantages 
are related to the process that brought up self-consciousness
10
.   
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    Fig. 3. Evolutionary approach to ancestral self-consciousness and to self-consciousness. 
 
c) The explanation about the nature of self-consciousness as it is proposed here is based on an 
evolution of the performances carried by our pre-human ancestors: inter-subjectivity and 
management of meaningful representations. Inter-subjectivity cannot come up alone in the 
mind of an individual. Inter-subjectivity needs at least two persons. To come up in evolution, 
self-consciousness needed the others. Self-consciousness is a result of group life. Also, self-
consciousness came up with the evolution of life and does not exist in the inanimate world. As 
the nature of life is unknown to today science and philosophy, the proposed evolutionary 
scenario is an explanation about the nature of self-consciousness if we do not question the 
nature of life. Such a status brings up questions regarding the possibility to create artificial 
intelligence without mastering artificial life (Menant, 2013). 
d) In the previous paragraphs, the occurrence of human self-consciousness in evolution was a 
possibility resulting from a combination of representations with an evolution of inter-
subjectivity. The evolutionary engine as introduced here has significantly increased that 
possibility of occurrence and raised it at a level of high probability. 
 
4) Evolution from ancestral self-consciousness to full-fledged self-consciousness 
4.1 From ancestral self-consciousness to full-fledged self-consciousness 
The evolutionary scenario presented here above has proposed an explanation for the nature of 
an elementary and embryonic form of self-consciousness that we have named ‘ancestral self-
consciousness’. Successful anxiety limitation with the resulting evolutionary engine opened 
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the road for an evolution of ancestral self-consciousness toward full-fledged self-
consciousness. A formal analysis of that evolution is a subject deserving a specific work that 
is beyond the scope of the current paper
 11
. We group under three headings the items that we 
feel should be taken into account in that work: evolutionary scenario, ancestral self-
consciousness and anxiety management.  
a) Evolutionary scenario: 
Our ancestral self-consciousness has been built up through an evolution of meaningful 
representations based on constraint satisfaction. The evolution of ancestral self-consciousness 
toward full-fledged self-consciousness should contain and use a similar representational 
system with the coming up of new constraints. 
Also, in addition to the assumed initial forking path based on anxiety management that led to 
humans and modern apes, others may have occurred during the evolution from ancestral self-
consciousness toward full-fledged self-consciousness. Part of Neanderthal extinction could 
perhaps be looked at that way. 
b) Ancestral self-consciousness:  
We have proposed that ancestral self-consciousness, an elementary and embryonic sense of 
being an existing entity, has not disappeared during her evolution toward our today full-
fledged self-consciousness. Ancestral self-consciousness has been enriched and transformed 
during that evolution and we consider that she is still existing and active as a diffuse sense of 
being in the background of our today human self-conscious mind. We humans are not all the 
time explicitly conscious of being. We are not all the time in self-conscious mental states but 
most often in a diffuse sense of being, close to the one produced by ancestral self-
consciousness. It is an implicit state, ready to make available an explicit ‘I am’ when our 
relations with the world or with ourselves request it. Such diffuse sense of being could be 
what evolution has left in our minds as inherited from the early stages of self-consciousness in 
evolution. The evolution from ancestral to full-fledged self-consciousness should take into 
account such possible continuations of ancestral self-consciousness.  
We have considered that first or third person perspectives as well as subject or object ones did 
not apply to ancestral self-consciousness. But these perspectives exist relatively to our today 
self-consciousness. They are to be taken into account in the evolution of ancestral self-
consciousness toward full-fledged self-consciousness. Work is in process on that subject 
(Menant 2014). 
c) Anxiety management:  
Our pre-human ancestors have implemented anxiety limitation processes allowing the coming 
up of ancestral self-consciousness and favoring the evolution toward full-fledged self-
consciousness. It is worth considering that these anxiety limitation processes may have by 
themselves introduced new sources of anxieties (which had in turn also to be limited). We 
consider that such anxiety management has been part of the evolution from ancestral self-
consciousness toward full-fledged self-consciousness, and is still active today. Examples are 
many. The simple cases about lack of reciprocity in caring and consolation, or about the risk 
of being excluded from the more and more performant group were new sources of anxities. 
Identifications with conspecifics also allowed the manipulation of others with reciprocity in 
counter measures introducing an evolutionary spiraling of ‘machiavellian intelligence’ (Byrne 
& Whiten, 1988). Such processes were also sources of new anxieties. Another example is the 
over usage of imitation: through excessive imitation our ancestors may have over-developed 
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the desire of what the other had or did up to impacting the overall group stability. Such 
perspective can be related to the mimetic theory where pre-humans borrowed their desires 
from conspecifics, leading to mimetic rivalry and to scapegoat mechanisms introducing 
sacrifice at the foundation of human culture (Girard, 2010). The sacrifice, as an action 
implemented to limit the anxiety of the group, has developed new individual anxieties coming 
from the fear of being sacrified.  
These creations of new anxieties were mostly unconscious and have penetrated all the aspect 
of life, leading to a sort of anxiety about being in the world.  
Also, as noted above, anxiety management as a permanent constraint brought in a permanent 
generation of anxiety related meanings in the minds of our ancestors. All these anxiety related 
meanings have been driving forces in human evolution, marking profoundly the nature of 
human mind with its potential psychological sufferings. 
Overall we can say that the evolution towards self-consciousness has been interwoven with 
permanent processes of anxiety management becoming an intimate part of human nature and 
probably contributing to many human specificities at individual and social levels.  
Such interdependence linking evolution towards self-consciousness and anxiety management 
deserves specific studies. 
4.2 Possible links with phenomenal consciousness  
We have seen that different perspectives can be used to address human consciousness. The 
choice in the current paper is to focus on self-consciousness understood as ‘the representation 
of oneself as an existing entity like others humans are represented as existing’. But the focus 
of today philosophy of mind is not on self-consciousness. It is on phenomenal consciousness, 
a key component of phenomenology. ‘Phenomenal consciousness is experience; what makes a 
state phenomenally conscious is that there is something ‘it is like’ (Nagel 1974) to be in that 
sate’ (Block, 1995). Phenomenal consciousness has connections with self-consciousness. For 
phenomenologists ‘a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of 
conscious experience’. And ‘this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential 
phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness’ which is 
present whenever we are undergoing an experience (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2010). The minimal 
form of self-consciousness of phenomenology looks close to the implicit sense of being an 
existing entity that characterizes ancestral self-consciousness in our today minds. This brings 
up the interest about comparing the nature of ancestral self-consciousness in our today minds 
with pre-reflective self-consciousness (assuming that the first/third person perspectives have 
been explicited for ancestral self-consciousness in our today minds). This comparison could 
introduce links between phenomenal consciousness and the proposed evolutionary nature of 
self-consciousness. Concerns about keeping self-consciousness firmly distinguished from 
phenomenal-consciousness are to be taken into account (Block, 1995). More work is needed 
on this subject. 
 
5) Continuations to the proposed evolutionary approach 
Among the points addressed in the above scenario, several call for more developments and 
could be part of a continuation to the current paper. Some have already been listed above as 
related to the evolution of ancestral self-consciousness towards full-fledged self-
consciousness and to the possible links with phenomenal consciousness. Others can be 
summarized as related to human mind, to anxiety management and to artificial intelligence. 
a) As related to human mind.  
- Ancestral self-consciousness has been introduced as the first step of our pre-human 
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ancestors in an elementary form of self-consciousness which has evolved up to our today full-
fledged self-consciousness, while staying active in our human mind. 
As proposed above, evolutionary relations are to be looked for between pre-reflective self-
consciousness and what remains in our today mind from ancestral self-consciousness. Such 
relations could also be looked for regarding primitive self-consciousness.  
- The concept of self has not been used in our evolutionary approach as it was not needed. But 
that concept is part of other approaches to human mind like proto-self, core-self or, 
autobiographical self (Damasio, 1999). The concept is also used when defining self-
consciousness as ‘the possession of the concept of the self and the ability to use this concept 
in thinking about oneself.’ (Block, 1995). It would be interesting to look at positioning a 
concept of human self relatively to self-consciousness as introduced here, and see how such 
concept could eventually be transposed to animals. 
- The proposed evolutionary scenario uses meaningful representations as generated by 
systems submitted to constraints. Human constraints are not well known. They are complex 
and difficult to define. ‘Limit anxiety’ and ‘look for happiness’ can be generic ones. Work is 
needed to better address and understand human constraints (Menant, 2011).  
- Inter-subjectivity is key to our evolutionary scenario. But its nature is not clearly understood 
by today science or philosophy. The performances associated to mirror neurons could 
probably be used as a starting point to gain some understanding about the nature of inter-
subjectivity (Ferrari & Gallese, 2007).  
- Human evolution is still active today and will probably go beyond us. We do not think that 
our today full-fledged self-consciousness represents the ultimate version of human self-
consciousness. A continuation of the proposed evolutionary scenario could provide a thread 
for that subject. 
- Our evolutionary scenario has not addressed the concept of free will. The issue of free will is 
a philosophical problem which has complex links with self-consciousness. We propose, as a 
continuation, to look at how the issue of free will could be linked to the nature of self-
consciousness as presented here.  
b) As related to anxiety management. 
- We humans share with animals basic emotions like fear and anger. But other emotions like 
happiness or contempt look more human specific. The proposed evolutionary scenario for 
self-consciousness could be used as a tool for investigating a phylogenesis of human 
emotions. 
- We have proposed that anxiety management has been a key contributor to the evolution of 
self-consciousness. It has been part of the birth of ancestral self-consciousness and of its 
evolution toward full-fledged self-consciousness. A more finalized analysis about the 
interactions of anxiety management with self-consciousness could bring new understandings 
on human nature in terms of motivations and actions. This subject deserves more 
developments including a possible dark side with human evil possibly rooted in anxiety 
management. As our evolution is not over this could shed some light on a possible maturing 
of human self-consciousness. Also, anxiety disorders being among today most common 
mental illnesses, analyzing the couplings between anxiety limitation and new anxieties 
creations could bring openings on that subject.  
- It has been proposed here that too much anxiety may have stopped the ongoing evolution of 
some pre-human primates and has guided them on a side track that led to today great apes. It 
would be interesting to transpose such a phylogenetic process on ontogenetic ones and 
consider excessive anxiety at individual level as a contributor to severe human mental 
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disorders.  
- Existential angst as presented by existentialism could be analized as an elaborated 
consequence of anxiety management being an intimate part of human mind (the sort of 
anxiety about being in the world introduced above). 
c) As related to artificial intelligence. 
The purpose of artificial intelligence is to design artificial agents that can be as intelligent as 
humans. Making available an evolutionary scenario for self-consciousness brings up the 
question about its usability for artificial agents.  
- Applications of the scenario to artificial intelligence bring to consider an inter-agentivity as 
being to artificial agents what inter-subjectivity is to living entities (Menant, 2007). The MGS 
can be used to define derived meaningful representations in artificial agents. The notion of 
inter-agentivity is to be developed, keeping in mind the intrinsicness of animal and human 
constraints and meanings as compared to the derived nature of the ones in artificial agents. 
Such differentiation of constraints and meanings as derived or intrinsic to the agent can be 
used to analyze the possibility for machine thinking (Menant, 2013).  
- In order to bring intrinsic constraints in artificial agents, the need to extend living entities 
into artificial agents may have to be considered. Such perspectives (which are beyond today 
hybrid artificial agents and neurons in artificial agent data processing) are to be investigated. 
Such approach also highlights specific ethical concerns (Menant 2013). 
 
6) Conclusion  
The proposed scenario about an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness is based on an 
evolution of inter-subjectivity and meaningful representations that has brought our pre-human 
ancestors to identify with their conspecifics. This process has led our ancestors to access an 
elementary and embryonic representation of themselves as existing entities, like conspecifics 
they identified with were represented as existing. We have named it ‘ancestral self-
consciousness’ and assumed that it is still present and active as a diffuse sense of being in the 
background of our today self-conscious minds. 
By the same process, identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics has generated 
an important anxiety increase, unbearable if not properly limited. To limit that anxiety our 
ancestors have favoured the development of coordinated action, understanding of other’s 
mental states, tasks simulation with action programs improvements and communication. 
These performances were interdependent and have called for the development of other ones 
like social rules, social learning and teaching, and language. These performances, associated 
with a positive feedback on inter-subjectivity, have built up an evolutionary engine which has 
allowed our ancestors to develop their ancestral self-consciousness up to our today full-
fledged self-consciousness. This evolutionary engine is based on anxiety limitation and 
positions human nature as closely interwoven with anxiety management processes that have 
become part of our behaviors and social organizations. 
It has been proposed that the evolutionary scenario could be used as a tool for investigating a 
phylogenesis of human emotions, and also as a thread for a better understanding of severe 
human mental disorders. Possible forking paths in evolution related to unsuccessful anxiety 
managements have also been presented, one leading to our today modern apes. 
The proposed approach also shows that the evolutionary advantages that can be attached to 
self-consciousness come from the evolutionary engine that has favoured her coming up rather 
than from self-consciousness by herself. 
Similarities between ancestral self-consciousness and pre-reflective self-consciousness have 
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introduced links to be investigated between phenomenal consciousness and the proposed 
evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. 
Possible continuations to the above scenario have been highlighted as related to human mind, 
to anxiety management and to artificial intelligence. 
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